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DiCTA

Florida Becomes 28th State To Adopt
Integrated Bar
The Florida Supreme Court by rule and order of court has recently
granted the petition of the Florida State Bar Association to become an integrated bar.' This brings the total number of bars having this form of
organization to twenty-eight. All bar organizations west of the Mississippi,
except Colorado, Montana and Kansas are now integrated.
The action of the Florida Supreme Court follows a vote undertaken by
the state bar association whereby 1,131 lawyers voted in favor of integration
and 500 against it, out of a potential lawyer population of 2,700. The court.
in a highly informative opinion calls attention to the fact that not one bar
association, once integrated, has ever returned to the voluntary system in
the 35 years of its history. The opinion continues:
"Letters received from the states in which the integrated bar has been
tested, recommend it as a vast improvement over the voluntary organization
and proclaim that they would under no circumstances return to the old
system.
"When we say the bar is integrated we mean that every lawyer within
a given area has membership in a cohesive organization. An organization of
less than all the members of the bar in a given area would not be an integrated bar. The area may be the state, the county or the city. The integrated
bar has also been defined as the process by which every member of the bar
is given an opportunity to do his part in performing the public service expected of him, and by which each member is obliged to bear his portion of
the responsibility. Annotation 114 A.L.R. 161. Another claim to merit
is that it provides a fair and equitable method by which every lawyer may
participate in and help bear the burden of carrying on the activities of the
bar instead of resting that duty on a voluntary association composed of a
minority membership.
"So the purpose of bar integration is in no sense punitive and there is
not a case on record in which it has been employed as a legal straight jacket
for disciplinary purposes. In some states it has no part whatever in disciplinary measures. In the states where bar integration has been adopted its major
energies are directed to projects designed to improve the administration of
justice, projects that awaken an interest in the science of jurisprudence, that
stimulate professional interest and that give the bar a just concept of its relation to the public. In some states the question of unlawful practice of law,
educational qualification for admission to the bar, and the discipline of members for unprofessional conduct, have been included in the integration agenda,
but they are incidental to the major energies of the integrated bar."
Re: Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 6/7/49.
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After discussing the State Bar of California, whose program since 1927
has resulted in increased confidence in and respect for lawyers in that state,
the court points out that the end result of integration there "is a stronger
and better informed bar, and it has so enlarged the confidence of the public
that its aid is sought for the recommendation to judicial appointments and it
is called upon to sponsor movements for the common good. Whatever it
fosters, it has the advantage of being able to call to its aid one hundred per
cent of its members."
Inherent Power of Judiciary to Integrate Bar
The court then considers whether it has inherent power to integrate the
bar by rule of court, and in that connection decides:
"Inherent power arises from the fact of the Court's creation or from thc
fact that it is a court. It is essential to its being and dignity and does not
require an express grant to confer it. Under our form of government it is
the right that each department of government has to execute the powers
falling naturally within its orbit when not expressly placed or limited by the
existence of a similar power in one of the other departments. In Re Nebraska
State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265. Inherent power should
be exercised with sound discretion. It should never be exercised arbitrarily
or in a despotic manner, neither should it be the product of pressure, passion
or prejudice.
"In 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W. (2d) 604, 151 A.L.R. 586, the question under
consideration was answered in the affirmative, the court saying: 'It has been
held by every court to which the question has been presented that the court
has power to integrate the bar and that the integration of the bar is a judicial
and not a legislative function.' In Re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma,
185 Okla. 505, 95 P. (2d) 113, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma expressed
the same view in these words: 'We conclude that this Court has the inherent power and authority to provide rules creating, controlling, regulating
and integrating the bar of the State of Oklahoma.'
"On June 16, 1944, the Supreme Court of Missouri integrated the bar
of that state by rule of Court. See Rule 7, Supreme Court Rules, 352 Mo.
XXXI.
"As already pointed out, bar integration in this county has been accomplished in 27 states. In Nebraska, Oklahoma, Missouri, and others it was done
by Rule of Court prescribing the powers and functions of the integrated
bar. In some states it was accomplished by Act of the Legislature, incorporating the bar and prescribing its powers and functions, and in other states it
was accomplished by an Act of the Legislature, authorizing the Supreme
Court to integrate the bar and prescribe its functions.
"The courts have taken the initiative in the bar integration on the
theory that bench and bar have a responsibility to support the honor and
dignity of the profession and to improve both the law and the administration
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of justice. The act of the legislature incorporating the bar and those authorizing the court to do so have recognized bar integration to be a judicial function,
in that they often do nothing more than withdraw from the field and memorialize the court to proceed to integrate."
Membership Fees Held Incident to Regulation
The court further considers the question of whether it may impose a
membership fee for the support of the integrated bar. The court concludes:
"If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the bar, it follows that
as an incident to regulation it may impose a membership fee for that purpose.
It would not be possible to put on an integrated bar program without means
to defray the expense. We think the doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carried with it the power to impose such an exaction.
"The requirement of membership in the State Bar Association with the
payment of a membership fee as a condition precedent to practice law has
been upheld in these States. In some of these cases the membership fee was
imposed by legislative act while in others it was imposed by rule of Court.
"Attorneys are not, under the law, State or County Officers, but they
acre officers of the Court and as such constitute an important part of the
judicial system. As was said in the case of In Re Nebraska State Bar Association, supra, the law practice is so intimately connected with the exercise of
judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and
regulate the practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department
of the government. A court of record has the inherent power to provide the
necessary assistance as a means of conducting its business. In so doing, it may
impose such fees as it may deem proper, that said fees are not a tax but may
be dispensed as the court directs. The last cited case also approves the theory
that while the legislature may impose minimum standards for admissions and
regulation of the bar, the courts have inherent power to impose additional
requirements.
"There is no substance to the contention that the integrated bar makes
one's right to practice law dependent on the caprice of his competitors, in that
it clothes a committee of lawyers with power to discipline for unprofessional
conduct. On the ballot used in the referendum one of the conditions was:
'Supervision of the Bar's disciplinary action by direct review of the Supreme
Court.' We construe this to mean that the investigation and trial of a lawyer
for unprofessional conduct must be a judicial proceeding in the manner provided by law or rule of this Court as defined in Petition of the State Bar
Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280. So the effect of the referendum was
to reenact the law already in effect. The matter of prescribing courses of
study and requirements for admission to the bar is also vested in this court by
law. They meet the requirements of the American Bar Association and there
is no suggestion here that they should be changed.
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"The states catalogued in this opinion as having adopted bar integration
were not the first to experiment with it. The English Bar was integrated early
in its history and, as we understand, has never abandoned integration. A study
of the objections voiced to integration convinces us that a great deal of misunderstanding has been generated about its objectives. The name given it was
perhaps unfortunate. It was not readily assimilated. It doubtless precipitated
some into an intellectual fog and one's natural impulse is to kick out of such
a phenomenon rather than put out the cerebral energy necessary to dispel it."
Experience Shows Objections Groundless
"It cannot be gainsaid that integration will be what the bar and the
court make of it. It was never designed to sacrifice the freedom and initiative
of the bar, its boldness and courage in challenging the cause of the downtrodden, nor its inherent independence in taking up battle for the minority.
It is no more akin to unionism and the closed shop than it is to the Rotary
Club or the Presbyterian Church. Nor was it intended as a means to aid groups
and cliques in the exercise of arbitrary power or to enforce their will on
others. In states where the integrated bar has been approved no such charges
have been lodged against it. Its avowed opponents have invariably become its
ardent supporters and the strength of its enlarged membership and budget
have enabled it to undertake many projects for the improved standing and
strength of the bar that it could not undertake with a minority membership.
The objections raised here to the integrated bar become utterly groundless in
the face of the fact that in every state where it has been adopted, whether by
rule of court or act of the legislature, it was done subject to supervision by the
courts. The work being accomplished by the integrated bar of California is
perhaps the strongest practical refutation of such thesis.
"Bar integration grew from a felt necessity for an organization that could
speak for the profession in esse. It is not a compulsory union but a necessary
one to secure the composite judgment of the bar on questions involving its
duty to the profession and the public. It is hardly necessary to assert that the
bar has a responsibility to the public that is unique and different from that
exacted of the members of other professions. This difference is symbolized in
the requirement that every lawyer subscribe to an oath to support, protect
and defend the constitution of the United States when he is admitted to practice. On the theory that he is such an important factor in the administration of
justice this Court has held that a lawyer's responsibility to the public rises
above his responsibility to his client. The very nature of our democratic
process imposes on him the responsibility to uphold democratic concepts regardless of how they affect the case in hand.
"There was a time when bar integration would not be supported
as strongly as it can at the present. The reason for it now is not discipline for unethical conduct but to alert the bar to professional and
public responsibility. We take no stock in the accusation that the bar
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is not worthy of public trust, we think by the square foot it contains
as many members of unblemished character as any profession. At
the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that, like the institutions of our country, it is under attack and that we have a duty to
meet and attack courageously. We think this duty devolves on the bar
as a whole rather than on a minority organization of it. The assault
on our institutions which the bar is expected to take the leading role
in challenging also requires the impact of the full manpower of the
bar. We do not think bar integration would be worth the candle as
a specific for unethical conduct, but as a means of giving the bar a new
and enlarged concept of its place in our social and economic pattern
it has amply proven its value.
"Bar integration may impose curbs on professional freedom. Likewise,
every other business must give place to restrictions that arise in the face of
growing populations. While alone on his island Robinson Crusoe enjoyed a
much greater degree of freedom than he would enjoy if he lived in Tallahassee at the present, but no one in Tallahassee would exchange the degree of
freedom he now has for that enjoyed by Crusoe. If Jacksonville should find
itself in the throes of a yellow fever epidemic the State Board of Health would
not hesitate to quarantine its citizenship and draft its full manpower including
doctors to put down the epidemic. Twice in the lives of many now living we
have drafted the young manhood of the country to put down what was said
to be an assault on democratic institutions. Growing populations and changing
conditions necessarily give rise to social and economic complexes that require
wisdom and discretion to cope with. The bar should be the first sector of the
population to comprehend this and order its house to meet such emergencies.
Mere Money Making Not Worthy of Profession
"We are conscious of the charge that the history of professional organizations since the 'guild' system of the middle ages has been one bent on enlarging
the economy and selfish designs of its members. The answer to this charge is
that if bar integration is to be nothing more than a spring board to leap for
power and pay and perquisites, if it has no purpose other than to grab at the
expense of others, it is unworthy the noble traditions of the profession. The
bar increases in public esteem by the precepts it lives by, not by the money it
makes. In fact, if money making is the lawyer's sole purpose, he worships a
god that is too small. If he does not approach the law as an avenue to perform
a fine public service, work hard, live by faith and die poor, he should turn
to some other business for food and shelter and raiment. It is true that now
and then one turns trader and finds the coveted pot of gold but not so if he
sticks strictly to his profession. The very nature of the lawyer's business is that
of trustee. If he makes a featherbed of that to sprawl on and pulls the cover
over his head oblivious to the things taking place around him he invites
merited criticism or disaster.
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"It follows thdt petitioners have made a case which warrants a rule of
this Court in integrating the bar of Florida as prayed for in the petition. It
provides the best means yet devised to enlist the full manpower of the bar in
the execution of its duty. It is also shown that in states where the integrated
bar has been tried, it has revealed none of the abuses lodged against it, but
on the other hand it has restored public confidence in the bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the bar's responsibility to the public, has
improved the administration of justice and is the only means presented
whereby every member of the bar can share in its public and professional
responsibility. We do not believe it will relieve the bar of ethical anemics,
crackpots and communists. Certainly this class should be screened out but the
law school is the logical place to do it. Moral sensitiveness is a rebound from
home discipline. A law to prohibit a man making a fool of himself would be
as effective as one to improve his morals.
"It is our view that integration would best serve the interest of the bar
and the public, that the objections raised to it are not well grounded, so the
petition to integrate is granted."

Knotis Men, Frunt and Scenter
Royal R. Irwin of Denver recently submitted the following Location
Certificate, recorded on June 25, 1918 in Book 205 at page 528 of the Jefferson County records, with the comment that in his opinion the Location Certificate is legally sufficient, "although the language and spelling used by the
Locator may be a bit confusing." With this masterly bit of under-statement
as a preface, we present the certificate verbatim:
KNOTis "ALL MEN" BY" These Presents "That i Louisa" E. Briggedettet Citey & Countey" oFF Dinver" & 1825 & 1317"26" STREETE" Room
"19" Denver, Colorado "Location "THE" Mountezell" Tunnel & Chall & Inn
Cline, Loads Mining Claim & And by THISS" Certificate" and by "right"
of" discovery "and" And" Location" Coaim" Mountzell Mining Claim "1500)
Hundred" Feete Lines And" Hoorizontal" Mesurement" along "The" thereof
With "All Itsdigs angles and "vareiations" as "allowed" by" law (3) Hundred
"FEETE" Wide on said vain "running" East & "West" from "Centre of the
discovrry" (3) H"S" 75 feet" and (11) Hundred "Running" feetrunning
"yains and Loads" FROM" the center of "discovery", cain & Incline" together with" side and Frunt "Stake"; feet no each" side of the Middle of
said vain at " surface and "all yains, lodes, ledges"; deqossite and surface"
ground within" the line of said, claim, situatee in "DEER CREEK, MINING
DISTRICT" Mining, Countey of Jefferson and "State of Colorado" and
described by "metes and bounds as follows, towit" Begging" at corner, no (1)
Adjoin-Barten "Load" Stake (7)-East" Cide Line"-Mountzell' "Stake No
(2) Thenn (seven Hunder, &, Fiffey. (75) Too, END" Off said Claim
Mount "ZELL "Stake" (3) Won "HUNDRED & FIFTEY" A lienient"
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FEETE & (150) Feete" Center" No" (4) BARTEN "LOAD: No" (5)
'Vain: Wone :Hundred & Fiften (150) FEETE" Too: Cide-Stake "No (5)
vain & LOad" orr PLASSER"-SVEEN" HUNDRED" Fiftey "FEETE"
(750) Too Scide End "Stake" (7) Then Hundred "last SCENTER" STAKE
BRENTH"& (150) To,;; STAKE",No" (S) Then "Too" CENTER
"STAKE" NO" (1) Wone "Stake, oFF, Begging "OFF" Said" Minningg"
Claim" "known" Mountvzell "Section" Eleven" (11) Townchiq Six" " (6).
Range "SEVENTY (70) "West" iNN" Jefferson "County" Sta-it" "OFF"
Colorado This "Load was Discovered" on" the 18 day' pf May, 1918, "Buy"
Louisa Evline Briggedgettet OFF 26" St & 1317-26" St" ROOM "19" &
2424" BLAKE STREET" DENVER" Col.

r................-...-.....................
................... . .................
..................................
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Affirmation Without Opinion and the Right of One Co-Tenant to Sue
Another In Conversion
It is submitted that as a proposition of law one co-tenant does not have
a right of action for conversion against another in this state at the present
time. Following what is obviously an inept and thoroughly discredited practice of affirming decisions without written opinion, the Supreme Court recently upheld a decision of the district court in the case of Weber vs. Seilbach
et al., 118 Colo. 578, allowing such a suit.
A complete transcript of the whole record and the entire testimony in
the case, together with lengthy and detailed law briefs with full specifications
of error, were filed in the Supreme Court. The only result was an evasion
of the argument entirely by the terse affirmation of what appears to us to
have been an unwholesome and indefensible verdict and judgment in the trial
court.
The right to maintain the suit in the district court at Greeley was attacked at the outset by a motion to dismiss. This right was contested throughout the entire suit. It was directly in issue in the case, was pointed out on
the motion for a new trial, and by the specification of points to the Supreme
Court. Even after the case had gone to decision, the error was again pointed
out in a petition for a rehearing, but the Supreme Court steadfastly refused
to discuss or rule upon this point.
(Mr. Weber thereupon submitted his brief, too long to be reprinted
here, on the point of law which was urged as ground for dismissal. In substance, the brief supported the proposition that since Section 3603 of the
Revised Statutes of 1908, permitting one co-tenant to sue another, had been
repealed by Section 11 of the Laws of 1932 at page 456, then the general

